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UNITED WE STAND, DISPARATE WE FALL:
PUTTING INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS OF
REVERSE REDLINING IN
TOUCH WITH THEIR CLASS
Andrew Lichtenstein*
Reverse redlining is a form of illegal lending discrimination in which
lenders target minority communities for unfair, overpriced loans. It
gives rise to a private right of action under the Fair Housing Act and
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Most often, plaintiffs bring reverse-
redlining claims under a disparate impact theory, which does not
require the plaintiff to show discriminatory intent and instead relies on
a showing ofstatistical disparities to state a prima facie case. However,
because this theory is predicated on abstract statistical information
instead of facts from the plaintiffs' actual experiences, plaintiffs and
their attorneys often fail to recognize reverse-redlining claims. Also,
plaintiffs who do recognize their claims lack the resources to
successfully do the detailed and extensive statistical analysis required
to state a prima facie case. Therefore, legislative action is needed to
shift the primary burden of preventing reverse redlining from private
plaintiffs to government agencies better equipped to investigate and
pursue reverse redlining.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Responding to an advertisement mailed to his residence,
Mr. Borrower, an African-American, goes to see Mr. Broker to
refinance his mortgage. Despite the fact that Mr. Broker routinely
gives price quotes on request, Mr. Broker refuses to give
Mr. Borrower a quote until Mr. Borrower allows Mr. Broker to run
his credit report.' Mr. Broker routinely provides customers with
information on several loan products, but he only gives
Mr. Borrower details on one. Despite the fact that Mr. Borrower's
income and credit score qualify him for a prime loan, Mr. Broker
offers him a costly subprime mortgage.2 However, because
Mr. Borrower is unfamiliar with Mr. Broker's routine business
practices, he does not know that he has received different treatment.
Mr. Borrower's new loan is an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)
with an interest rate that could rise to 11.625 percent.3 While
Mr. Borrower's initial monthly payments are capped at $2,420, the
interest rate soon rises to the point where the payment does not cover
the interest due each month. This results in negative amortization-
which means that the amount of unpaid interest is added to the loan's
principal.4 Eventually, the loan reaches the recast point at which
Mr. Borrower's payments must adjust in order for him to fully repay
the principal by the end of its thirty-year term.' Payment caps do not
apply to this adjustment,6 resulting in his monthly payment spiking
to $3,996. This sudden payment increase puts Mr. Borrower in
imminent danger of foreclosure.
1. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., ALL OTHER THINGS BEING
EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS 26 (2002). The above
hypothetical is loosely based on real-life accounts in that report.
2. A "subprime loan" is a loan with more burdensome terms than those of a "prime loan"
and is designed for a borrower who lacks the income or credit score to qualify for a prime loan.
See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 17
(2008).
3. These terms are loosely based on Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., Nos. 04 CV
875(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 187(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5302(RJD)(KAM),
05 CV 5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5679(RJD)(KAM), 2007 WL 2437810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2007). See Amended Complaint at T 128-31, Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., No. CV 04 875,
2007 WL 2437810 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Barkley Complaint].
4. FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES A4
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/armsbrochure.pdf.
5. Id at 14.
6. Id
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Hoping to prevent this fate, Mr. Borrower goes to see a
bankruptcy attorney. Unbeknownst to Mr. Borrower or his attorney,
the facts indicate that Mr. Borrower is a victim of "reverse
redlining," an illegal practice by which lenders target certain racial
groups for loans with particularly unfair terms.' Under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA)8 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA),9 Mr. Borrower may have a cause of action that can
compensate him for the financial loss he has suffered due to this
illegal activity. To state a claim for reverse redlining, Mr. Borrower
would have to show that a business practice of his lender has resulted
in a disproportionate number of African-Americans receiving overly
costly loans.'o
Mr. Borrower has no idea whether his lender has engaged in a
practice of originating high-cost subprime loans to other African-
Americans who qualified for prime mortgages. Moreover,
bankruptcy proceedings are based on each debtor's personal
situation-his debts, his assets, his potential for future income-
rather than on his membership in a class. Listening to
Mr. Borrower's tale of financial woe, the bankruptcy attorney does
not recognize Mr. Borrower's cause of action for reverse redlining.
This Article contends that a disconnect between the facts within
a plaintiff's knowledge and the information necessary to successfully
state a reverse-redlining claim thwarted civil enforcement of the
FHA and ECOA in the years leading up to the current home
mortgage crisis for two reasons. First, potential plaintiffs and their
lawyers failed to recognize reverse-redlining claims from the nature
of the plaintiffs' individual injuries. Second, even if potential
plaintiffs realized they might have valid discrimination claims, the
requirement for plaintiffs to allege facts beyond their individual
experiences amounted to a heightened pleading standard that could
only be surmounted by costly pre-discovery investigations. Both of
7. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 733 (2006).
8. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(2006)).
9. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691-
169 If (2006)).
10. E.g., Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922, 927 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
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these factors have recently prevented any private plaintiffs from
successfully pursuing individual reverse-redlining claims."
While Congress intended the FHA and ECOA to be enforced
primarily through private litigation, 2 this approach is unrealistic in
the reverse-redlining context. New legislation must provide federal
agencies with new powers and a new mandate to eliminate lending
discrimination, shifting enforcement of the FHA and ECOA from
private litigants to government actors better positioned to investigate
and pursue illegal reverse-redlining activities.
Part II of this Article will discuss the current state of reverse-
redlining law, focusing on disparate impact theory as the primary
tool for confronting lending discrimination. Part III will explain that
a great number of potential plaintiffs have failed to recognize their
legal claims. Part IV will demonstrate the formidable fact-finding
obstacles plaintiffs face in the pleading stage. Part V will recommend
legislative action to enhance enforcement of the FHA and ECOA and
examine the costs and benefits of such action. Part VI will conclude
that while more effective enforcement is a start, the ultimate goal of
the FHA and ECOA is for there to be no need for enforcement at all.
Unfortunately, that day is a long way off.
II. AN UNEASY UNION: DISPARATE IMPACT
THEORY AND REVERSE REDLINING
The mortgage meltdown has disproportionately injured
communities of color.13 African-American and Latino borrowers
were far more likely than whites to receive overpriced loans. 4 While
differences in income and credit histories may explain some of these
irregularities, objective underwriting criteria cannot explain the wide
discrepancies between loan products sold to minority and white
11. Only municipalities and class representatives have succeeded bringing reverse-redlining
cases as of late. E.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d
702 (D. Md. 2009), dismissed on other grounds, 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010); NAACP v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Taylor v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F.
Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008); Ramirez, 633 F. Supp. 2d 922.
12. S. REP. NO. 94-589, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,415.
13. Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act
and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOv'T L.
REv. 164, 173 (2009).
14. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007HMDA Data, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. A107, A125 (2008).
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borrowers." The disparities in the credit terms extended to minority
and white borrowers correlate with the differences in foreclosure
rates between these communities." Reverse redlining has caused this
crisis to fall hardest on minorities, producing an unprecedented
foreclosure crisis in these communities. 7
Courts have struggled to apply existing law to the problem of
reverse redlining for several reasons.'" First, reverse redlining is
more subtle than traditional lending discrimination. Second, courts
currently juggle two tests for determining the validity of a prima
facie reverse-redlining case, applying one or the other depending on
whether the case is brought by an individual plaintiff or as a class
action. Third, demonstrating reverse redlining requires statistical
information, but the only public source of this data available to most
private plaintiffs omits key facts, requiring courts to sustain or
dismiss claims of discrimination based on conjecture. Finally,
complicated administrative enforcement and public litigation
procedures under the FHA and ECOA further confuse reverse-
redlining adjudication.
A. Reverse Redlining:
The New Face ofLending Discrimination
The term "redlining" describes a particular type of
discriminatory practice where lenders systematically exclude certain
15. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at
35, Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md.
2009) (No. L-08-62) [hereinafter Mayor & City Council of Balt. Complaint]; Michael Aleo &
Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's Attack on Disparate Impact Race
Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 1, 19-20 (2008); Brescia, supra note 13, at 174; Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen,
Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods 3 & n.2, 11 (Fed. Res. Bank of
Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-1), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
wp0901.pdf; infra Part IV.A.
16. See Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Minorities Hit Hardest as New York Foreclosures
Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at Al.
17. Mayor & City Council of Balt. Complaint, supra note 15, at 4 ("Wells Fargo's
disproportionately high foreclosure rate in Baltimore's African-American neighborhoods is the
result of reverse redlining."); Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 1 (describing how reverse
redlining has led to the foreclosure crisis in minority communities); Gerardi & Willen, supra note
15 ("[H]omes purchased with [subprime] mortgages are lost to foreclosure much more frequently
than those purchased with prime mortgages.").
18. See Brescia, supra note 13, at 198 ("[T]rial courts are challenged by the fact that reverse
redlining requires an approach to the anti-discrimination jurisprudence that might not square with
its traditional frames . . . ."); Willis, supra note 7, at 831 (describing the chasm between
borrowers and the law).
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communities from their services." Inversely, "reverse redlining" is
the practice by which lenders target these communities for loans with
particularly onerous and unfair terms.20 Because discrimination is
manifested in the terms of credit proffered rather than in a flat denial,
it is more subtle.
The hypothetical at the beginning of this Article represents a
common scenario. Mr. Borrower responded to a mailed
advertisement to refinance his mortgage, and Mr. Broker steered him
into a subprime product. However, Mr. Borrower could not prove
that Mr. Broker targeted him based on these facts alone. In order to
succeed with a legal claim, Mr. Borrower would have to provide
evidence that Mr. Broker treated him differently than other similarly
situated borrowers.
B. Disparate Impact Theory:
Confronting New Wrongs with Old Rights
Because proving discriminatory intent is difficult, plaintiffs who
sue under civil rights statutes usually base their claims on the
"effects" of the alleged discrimination rather than on circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory purpose.21 Congress has codified this
strategy, known as disparate impact theory, in the amendments to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.22 Courts recognized this
doctrine long before its congressional enactment,2 3 and references to
an "effects test" appear in the ECOA's legislative history.24
1. Two Prima Facie Cases for Two Types of Plaintiffs
Recently, courts have struggled to apply the disparate impact
framework that Congress developed for Title VII employment
19. Brescia, supra note 13, at 179.
20. Id.; Willis, supra note 7, at 733.
21. See Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 22.
22. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (2006)).
23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
24. See S. REP. No. 94-589, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 415
(describing discrimination as "presumptively intentional"); see also 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.2
(2009) ("The legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended an 'effects test'
concept, as outlined in the employment field by the Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), to be
applicable to a creditor's determination of creditworthiness.").
1346 [Vol. 43:1339
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discrimination claims to reverse redlining.25 In Matthews v. New
Century Mortgage,2 in which four elderly plaintiffs alleged that their
lender had targeted them for overpriced loans because of their sex
and marital status,2 7 the court developed a four-part test to assess the
plaintiffs' reverse-redlining claims. Under the "Matthews test," the
plaintiff must show: (1) he or she is a member of a protected class;
(2) he or she applied for a loan and was qualified for that loan; (3) he
or she received a loan on grossly unfair terms; and (4) the lender
continued to give loans to similarly qualified applicants on
significantly better terms.28 Also, if the plaintiff presents "direct
evidence" that the defendant specifically targeted on the basis of
race, the plaintiff is not required to show that the lender gave more
favorable loans to others.29
However, in Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. 30
and similar class-action cases," courts applied a framework that
emphasized the injury to the class as a whole rather than to
individual plaintiffs. Under the "Ramirez test," a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) there was a significant disparate impact on a
protected class, and (2) the impact was caused by an identified
lending practice.32 After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the disputed practice is
"consistent with business necessity."3 3 In reverse-redlining cases, the
business justification most commonly offered by lenders is that the
25. Brescia, supra note 13, at 187 ("The reverse redlining problem raises a new challenge
for the Title VII/Title ViII framework . . . ").
26. 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
27. Id. at 887.
28. Id. at 886. For other courts applying this test, see Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. C-09-2035 SC, 2009 WL 2365881 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2009); Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc.,
No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); Hafiz v. Greenpoint
Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co.,
Nos. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 187(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV
5302(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5679(RJD)(KAM), 2007 WL 2437810
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007); and Wiltshire v. Dhanraj, 421 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
29. See Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87.
30. 633 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
31. E.g., Mayor & City Council of Bait. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D.
Md. 2009), dismissed on other grounds, 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010); NAACP v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Taylor v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F.
Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008).
32. Ramirez, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
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alleged disparities are consistent with differences in creditworthiness
among classes of borrowers.34
The Ramirez test, with its focus on class-wide effects, better
suits plaintiffs seeking class-wide relief. Proving that the loan of
each class member is "grossly unfair," as required by the Matthews
test, is not feasible. However, individual plaintiffs may have more
success under the Matthews model. Under this scheme, individual
plaintiffs could satisfy the first three elements- 1) that they are
members of a protected class, (2) that they were qualified for and
received a loan, and (3) that they received a loan on grossly unfair
terms-with their own credit histories and loan documents. The
standard also does not require plaintiffs to point to a specific lender's
policy as the source of the discrimination.
Even so, the Matthews framework still poses considerable
problems for individual plaintiffs. The fourth prong necessitates that
individual plaintiffs compare their loans to those of other similarly
qualified borrowers. While plaintiffs may avoid this requirement by
demonstrating intentional targeting based on race, this alternative
provides no benefit to plaintiffs who do not uncover smoking-gun
evidence of intentional racial targeting. Thus, for those plaintiffs
without direct evidence of racial animus, the Matthews test still calls
for considerable investigation into facts beyond the plaintiffs
knowledge.
2. Utilizing Statistics to Demonstrate Disparate Impact
Both of the standards outlined above require the plaintiff to
provide statistical evidence to state a claim." Under the Ramirez
approach, this quantitative support is necessary to establish "a
significant disparate impact on a protected class . . . ."3 Under the
Matthews approach, statistics prove that "the lender continues to
provide loans to other applicants with similar qualifications, but on
significantly more favorable terms."3 7
34. See Brescia, supra note 13, at 210-11.
35. See Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 27 ("Proving that a certain policy has broad
discriminatory effects without statistics is obviously quite difficult.").
36. Ramirez, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
37. Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
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a. The history of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
Typically, the only source of relevant data outside of the
lender's own files is provided for by the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA), which requires mortgage lenders to disclose certain
data on the loans they generate." Congress enacted the HMDA in
1975 to curb redlining by depository banks that took deposits from
low-income customers but neglected to reinvest that money in the
form of loans to those same communities.39 Under the first reporting
requirements, lenders had to disclose the geographical locations and
dollar amounts of the loans they generated.4 0 In the 1980s, as
regional and nationwide non-depository lenders took over much of
the mortgage market, regulators' concerns shifted from reinvestment
to racial discrimination.4 1 Hence, since 1989 the HMDA has required
lenders to report data on the racial composition of their applicants
and borrowers.4 2
b. The current HMDA data
With the rise of reverse redlining, Congress amended the
HMDA again.4 3 Starting in 2004, the HMDA mandated that lenders
disclose the number of first-lien mortgage loans 44 extended to each
racial group with annual percentage rates (APR)45 that are at least
three percentage points higher than the interest rate paid to holders of
U.S. treasury securities with comparable maturity periods. 46 Banks
are not required to report loans with interest rates below this
threshold.
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2006).
39. Joseph M. Kolar & Jonathan D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Its
History, Evolution, and Limitations, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 189, 189-90 (2005).
40. Id at 190.
41. Id
42. Id. at 195-96.
43. Id
44. A first-lien mortgage loan has priority over all other liens on the property that secures the
mortgage. Second-lien mortgage loans are only secured by the amount that the value of the
property exceeds the amount owed on the first-lien mortgage.
45. APR is the total cost of a loan manifested as a yearly percentage rate. FED. RESERVE
BD., supra note 4, at 27. It includes interest, fees, and mortgage insurance premiums. Id
46. See Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 18; see also Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council,
About the Rate Spread Calculator (2009), http://www.ffiec.gov/ratespread/oldcalchelp.aspx
(providing guidelines for calculating the rate spread in order to comply with HMDA reporting
requirements). The spread triggering reporting for second liens is five points above the
comparable U.S. treasury securities. Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 18.
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The data are categorized by loan type (purchase loans,
refinances, etc.) and are amassed both on a nationwide scale and for
each geographical area the lender services.47 The data for a single
type of loan in a particular geographical area are arranged in a table
that lists the following for each borrower racial group: the number of
loans without price reporting (because the rates are not three
percentage points higher than comparable U.S. securities); the
number of loans with price reporting; and the number of loans with
APRs that fall within each specified range above the margin.48 The
table below, which is based on Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s ("Wells
Fargo") 2005 data for the Los Angeles area,49 provides a simplified
illustration."
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3-3.99% 4-4.99%
price price
African-American 629 73 35 25
White 7479 218 141 59
Hispanic 2515 193 115 60
The data in the table indicate that over 10 percent (73 out of
702) of the African-American borrowers represented received loans
costly enough to qualify for price reporting, while under 3 percent
(218 out of 7697) of the white borrowers received such loans.5
47. FFIEC.gov, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Disclosure Report, http://www.ffiec.gov/
hmdaadwebreport/DisWelcome.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (providing drop-down menus for
users to select lender, geographical location, and loan type).
48. See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAM. COUNCIL, DISCLOSURE TABLE 11-7: PRICING
INFORMATION FOR CONVENTIONAL REFINANCING LOANS, FIRST LIEN, 1- TO 4-FAMILY OWNER-
OCCUPIED DWELLING (EXCLUDES MANUFACTURED HOMES), BY BORROWER OR CENSUS TRACT
CHARACTERISTICS, 2005 (2006), http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/pdf/2005/Hmda/temp/
2005HD1 1-7 0000001741131084.PDF.
49. Id.
50. The actual reports include data on loans with APRs up to 8 percent over the applicable
U.S. security, several more racial groups, and other factors such as borrower income and
residential census tract.
51. To do the math, first add the number of loans without price reporting (column one) and
the number of loans with price reporting (column two) in the "African-American" row to get the
total number of loans extended to African-Americans in 2005: 702. Then divide the number of
loans with price reporting by 702 to get the percentage of African-American loans with interest
rates that fell within the price reporting range: 10.4 percent. Repeating the same steps for white
borrowers yields 2.8 percent.
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While these data help establish a disparate impact, they still omit
important information like borrowers' FICO scores and their
mortgage loan-to-value ratios. 52 This is significant because reverse-
redlining plaintiffs must demonstrate a disparate impact among
similarly situated persons: people with similar incomes and
creditworthiness." Also, if the burden shifts to the defendant to
present its business necessity defense, the HMDA data cannot
controvert any evidence that the disparities resulted from objective
underwriting criteria.54 Still, the HMDA data are the most obvious
place for the reverse-redlining plaintiff to start building a claim, and
they play an important role in most plaintiffs' briefs and pleadings."
C. The Second Front:
Government Enforcement of the FHA and ECOA
In addition to enforcement by private litigants, the FHA and
ECOA both have provisions that enable federal agencies to enforce
the acts.56 The FHA designates the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) as the primary agency responsible for
administering the law." Under the FHA, HUD must investigate and
resolve complaints of alleged victims of housing discrimination;"
HUD also may, but is not required to, investigate discriminatory
housing practices on its own accord.59 In reality, administrative
enforcement of the FHA is primarily driven by complaints filed by
private citizens.60
52. Charles A. Harwood, Recent FTC Developments, in FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION
INSTITUTE 2008, at 181 (PLI Handbook Series No. 14257, 2008).
53. See, e.g., Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528,
at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009).
54. See Brescia, supra note 13, at 210-11.
55. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. Complaint, supra note 15, at IT 32-37; Class
Action Complaint at 33, Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass.
2008) (No. 07cvl 1275-NG) [hereinafter Miller Class Action Complaint].
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (2006). Congress amended the FHA to
enhance administrative involvement in 1988 after concluding that enforcement of the act had
been insufficient. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 16 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2177 ("Existing law has been ineffective because it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.").
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a).
58. Id. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv).
59. Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(iii).
60. In 2008, HUD reported investigating 10,552 complaints from private citizens while only
launching four of its own investigations. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF
FAIR HOUSING: FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING 2, 24, 32 (2008), available at
http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/fy2008annual-rpt.pdf.
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The ECOA's public enforcement provisions are more
troublesome because they fail to specify a single comprehensive
agency for handling complaints."1 Rather, ten different federal
agencies enforce the Act depending on which type of financial
institution a complainant alleges has engaged in lending
discrimination.6 2 In addition, the ECOA does not contain its own
enforcement provision. Instead, regulators' powers to enforce the
ECOA stem from one of several other laws, again dependent on the
type of lender implicated.6 3 This complicated enforcement scheme
can result in great confusion for reverse-redlining victims who wish
to file complaints alleging ECOA violations.'
The Department of Justice (DOJ) may file its own action under
the FHA or ECOA, but only in limited circumstances, such as when
the DOJ has reasonable cause to believe that a lender has engaged in
a "pattern or practice" of housing discrimination.6" Courts have
defined "pattern or practice" as "an intentional, regular, or repeated
violation of . .. the Act."66 If the court finds that a pattern or practice
is likely, the DOJ will have standing to bring the suit."
Regardless of the procedure employed, federal agencies that
bring reverse-redlining actions must prove the same prima facie case
as individual plaintiffs.6 8 In addition, to the extent that individual
complaints drive agency enforcement, the process suffers from the
same claim-recognition problems that impede private litigants,
described below.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(c).
62. See id
63. See id
64. See Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify Federal
Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 549 (1993) ("[T]he
ECOA enforcement scheme is markedly more confusing [than the FHA's scheme].").
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006).
66. E.g., United States v. Quality Built Constr., 309 F. Supp. 2d 756, 760 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a).
68. See Complaint for Compensatory and Punitive Damages, Civil Money Penalties and
Injunctive Relief, at T 22-25, United States v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. CV-96-6159 (C.D.
Cal. 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing/documents/longbeachcomp.php.
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III. MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES-WHY INDIVIDUAL
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE REVERSE-REDLINING CLAIMS
Despite the administrative-enforcement and public-litigation
provisions described above, legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the FHA and ECOA to be enforced primarily by
individual plaintiffs."9 However, the FHA and ECOA have failed to
eliminate reverse redlining because victims of this practice often do
not realize they have legal recourse. There are several reasons for
this failure. First, psychological barriers to perceiving discrimination
are heightened in the reverse-redlining context. Next, the confusing
world of mortgage lending dilutes and obfuscates facts that could aid
borrowers in recognizing discrimination. Finally, the traditional
legal-consultation model has prevented attorneys from easily
detecting the reverse-redlining claims of their clients.
A. Psychological Barriers to Recognizing Reverse-Redlining Claims
In general, discrimination claims are litigated far less than other
grievances."o Reverse redlining is likely to mirror this broader under-
complaining trend. First, most reverse-redlining plaintiffs are in the
midst of personal financial crises, and their hardships prevent them
from perceiving a widespread injury to their racial group. Second,
the individualism inherent in home ownership discourages potential
plaintiffs from identifying with others similarly situated. Finally, the
isolation of "subprime communities" deprives reverse-redlining
victims of the perspective necessary to compare their own situations
to those of more advantaged groups.
69. S. REP. No. 94-589, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 415; see also
Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to
Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 909, 910 (1991) ("[The Fair
Housing Act] is enforced primarily through lawsuits initiated by individual victims of
discrimination or by fair housing organizations."). While Congress did enhance administrative
enforcement in its 1988 amendments to the FHA, in the same bill it also removed the previous
limit on punitive damages, demonstrating that Congress had not abandoned its stated goal that
private individuals would enforce the act through civil lawsuits. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 40
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2200-01.
70. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not Confront: Measuring Claiming Rates in
Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 875, 884 (1991).
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1. Individual Financial Woes Supersede Those of the Class
Most people do not even consult lawyers until they face a crisis
like the foreclosure of their home.' Furthermore, personal calamities
are incompatible with the mindset it takes to recognize and assert a
reverse-redlining claim. Basic tenets of psychology reveal that
people in the midst of crises do not consider how their personal
predicaments relate to the tribulations of others. Psychologist
Abraham Maslow, in his theory popularly known as the "hierarchy
of needs," established that human beings must first satisfy basic
needs such as food and shelter before pursuing loftier goals such as
love and community.72 When potential plaintiffs' primary concern is
as basic as keeping their homes, most would not even contemplate a
system of widespread discrimination. When an individual faces
foreclosure, the individual's thoughts are understandably focused on
his or her own predicament and not on that of similarly situated class
members."
2. The Rewards and Responsibilities of
Home Ownership Conflict with Class Identification
People have a drive to believe that the world is fundamentally
fair-a meritocracy.74 The meritocracy worldview allows people to
71. See Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-09-2035 SC, 2009 WL 2365881, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 30, 2009); Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041
(N.D. Cal. 2009); Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 878 (S.D. Ohio
2002) ("New Century ... filed a complaint against Ms. Morgan for foreclosure of her home.");
Complaint at 43, Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16(J6)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Williams Complaint] ("Mr. Williams received a letter from Bank of
America stating that it was going to foreclose .... ); Barkley Complaint, supra note 3, at T 158;
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 04-875) ("As a result of the property flipping scheme and the intentionally
inflated mortgage that resulted, [Ms. Barkley] is saddled with inflated monthly payments that
exceed 70% of her income, which she is struggling to pay, and is at risk of losing her home.");
First Amended Complaint at 1 35, Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.
D.C. 2000) (CIV. A. 98-1021(JH6)) [hereinafter Hargraves Complaint] ("Defendants . . .
obtained an order from the bankruptcy court permitting defendants to foreclose . . . .").
72. Abraham Maslow, A Theory ofHuman Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REv. 370 (1943).
73. Julia Scelfo, After the House Is Gone, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2008, at Dl ("'When you
don't have a home . . . [a]ll you think about is when I'm going to have a home again?"'); see
Lauren E. Willis, Will the Mortgage Market Correct? How Households and Communities Would
Fare If Risk Were Priced Well, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 1177, 1189 (2009) ("Foreclosure include[s]
loss of a household's autonomy, social status, community networks, and sense of stability."); see
also Stephanie M. Stem, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology ofHome, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 1093, 1095 (2009) ("Involuntary dislocation wreaks psychological devastation .... ).
74. Deborah Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces
and Legal Narratives That Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679, 688 (2007);
1354 [Vol. 43:1339
UNITED WE STAND, DISPARATE WE FALL
feel that they have control over their lives and that they alone are
responsible for their successes and failures." Those who adopt this
worldview are often averse to perceiving themselves as the victims
of discrimination.76 In addition to believing that they alone control
their destinies, they perceive themselves as individuals unaffiliated
with a class, especially if their class endures stigma and prejudice. 7
While this ideology presents an obstacle to any disparate impact
claim, it is especially potent when combined with the American
cultural narrative of home-ownership, which emphasizes on
individualism." For minorities who, despite racism, ascend in society
to the point where they can own their own homes, individualism
provides them with the perception that they earned their success."
Home ownership has psychologically set them apart from their class.
But when they default, the same philosophy instructs them that they
alone are responsible for their predicaments.so Their fall, like their
rise, must be borne alone.
3. Reverse-Redlining Victims Lack the Perspective to Notice the
Disparity Between Themselves and the Favored Class
Perception of discrimination depends on victims comparing
themselves to people of other classes.' In the reverse-redlining
context, without knowing that other groups have enjoyed more
advantageous loans, victims have no way of understanding how
grossly unfair their own loans are in comparison. However, people
Aaron Kay et al., Victim Derogation and Victim Enhancement as Alternate Routes to System
Justification, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 240, 240 (2005).
75. See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on
Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 807-08 (2006).
76. Brake, supra note 74, at 690.
77. Id.
78. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 336 (1998)
(describing the relationship between individualism and American home ownership); Barclay
Thomas Johnson, Give to the Rich: A Review of From Tenements to the Taylor Homes: In Search
of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 79, 83 (2001)
(book review) (stating that America has historically viewed single-family home ownership as
fostering individualism).
79. See Kaiser & Major, supra note 75, at 807.
80. See id at 808.
81. See Brake, supra note 74, at 693; Alexandra F. Coming, Self-Esteem as a Moderator
Between Perceived Discrimination and Psychological Distress Among Women, 49 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 117, 118 (2002).
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tend to compare themselves to members of their own racial group.82
This phenomenon is perpetuated by patterns of lending
discrimination and segregation. Because victimized borrowers often
live in the same communities,13 their only points of reference are
other victims of the same practice.
Targets of on-site employment discrimination usually have
coworkers that belong to more privileged groups that enable them to
gauge their own salaries and promotional opportunities.84
Admittedly, bias may not be as evident when the problem is the
denial of a job rather than discrimination that occurs at work."
However, a single job interview might provide applicants with some
idea of the racial makeup of the workplace they are attempting to
access." In contrast, reverse redlining occurs in particular
communities that are relatively isolated from the rest of the world.
B. Informational Asymmetries and Financial
Illiteracy Keep Borrowers in the Dark
In addition to a potential plaintiff lacking personal knowledge of
the operative facts of a reverse-redlining claim, the complex nature
of mortgage transactions renders any clues to the plaintiffs rights
either inaccessible or incomprehensible. First, reverse-redlining
victims face huge information gaps between themselves and their
lenders. Second, many borrowers' financial illiteracy inhibits them
from understanding the facts that are available. Finally, current
mandated disclosures only serve to confuse borrowers more.
The term "[i]nformation asymmetries"" describes the imbalance
of information that sometimes exists between market participants. A
82. Cf Brake, supra note 74, at 693-94 (discussing intra-social group comparisons in the
context of women in professional jobs).
83. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council ofBalt. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2.
84. See Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No.
124) (comparing the salaries and responsibilities of specific black and white employees with
similar qualifications).
85. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16 (1996) (stating that in 1992 only
17.8 percent of EEOC cases involved discriminatory hiring claims).
86. See Emily B. White, Comment, How We Treat Our Guests: Mobilizing Employment
Discrimination Protections in a Guest Worker Program, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269,
293-94 (2007) (acknowledging that knowing the racial composition of the workplace to which
one has been denied access is essential to detecting a failure-to-hire discrimination claim).
87. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Qualitative Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970); Brescia, supra note 13, at 171.
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significant informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers
further aggravates plaintiffs' difficulties." For example, lenders have
no obligation to tell borrowers their credit scores or inform them
about other loan products for which they would have qualified."
Even if borrowers do obtain their credit reports, they usually do not
know how their scores translate into the estimates of risk and loan
performance that form the basis of loan pricing." Without this
information, many borrowers with good credit who received
subprime loans assumed these loans were the best loans available to
them9 1 and blamed themselves for the inability to pay their
mortgages.92
Federally mandated disclosures" only cause greater confusion to
borrowers. Not only do the documents exclude several important
loan costs, but until recently,9 4 borrowers also received those costs
too late in the negotiating process to take them into account in
making a decision." In addition, understanding these disclosures
requires familiarity with numerous esoteric terms.96 Meanwhile,
mortgagors have no incentive to clarify the terms.97 Instead,
mortgagors maintain these information asymmetries so that they may
exploit them at the borrowers' expense. 98
The confusion caused by the mortgage transaction wreaks havoc
beyond the origination of the loan. If borrowers do not understand
the terms of their own loans, then they cannot compare themselves to
other similarly situated borrowers. Furthermore, even when the
prospect of foreclosure and bankruptcy compel a reverse-redlining
88. See Brescia, supra note 13, at 171.
89. See Kenneth R. Harney, Past Credit Woes Don't Have to Haunt High-Rate Borrowers,
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2002, at H I.
90. Willis, supra note 7, at 808.
91. See Miller Class Action Complaint, supra note 55, at T 69; Willis, supra note 7, at 730
(stating that nearly half of borrowers with subprime loans could have qualified for prime credit).
92. Scelfo, supra note 73, at DI ("[S]he is consumed by guilt over the foreclosure.").
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006).
94. Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, which became effective in July 2009, now
require lenders to mail disclosures to customers within three days of receiving their loan
application. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a) (2009).
95. Willis, supra note 7, at 749.
96. Id. at 752-53.
97. See id at 797 (describing a lender who did not explain the disclosures to a borrower with
only a sixth-grade education or give him time to review the papers).
98. See id at 808.
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victim to seek the assistance of a lawyer, the lawyer will also often
fail to see the victim's claim.
C. Legal Consultations Fail to Bring
Reverse-Redlining Victims' Claims to Light
As shown in the earlier hypothetical, even when Mr. Borrower
sought the advice of a bankruptcy attorney, the attorney failed to
detect his claim. Indeed, the traditional legal consultation paradigm
will usually miss claims based on class-wide injuries. This problem
is furthered by bankruptcy and real-estate attorneys' general lack of
familiarity with civil rights law. Further, individuals seeking legal
advice tend to want immediate appraisal of their legal rights, which
discourages lawyers from performing the necessary statistical
research to discern viable reverse-redlining claims.
During the initial attorney-client interview, the attorney attempts
to develop legal theories based on the facts provided by the potential
client." Because the key facts that compose a reverse-redlining
claim-namely statistics that show that the client's lender offered
less-advantageous credit terms to the client's racial class than to
other similarly situated borrowers-are outside the client's personal
knowledge, this process inevitably misses this cause of action.100
To add another obstacle, attorneys often employ checklists of
potential legal claims and defenses common to their practice areas.
These attorneys utilize this method to quickly identify courses of
action from the facts offered by their clients.'"' However, checklists
often "fail to include such matters as the unusual cause of action or
99. DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 38 (1977) ("To help clients find satisfactory solutions to their
problems, lawyers will typically need to gather information about . . . the facts which comprise
the past transactions from which the problem arises . . . ."); Telephone Interview with Peter M.
Lively, Owner, Law Office of Peter Lively (Dec. 30, 2009) (explaining that the debtor's income,
property assets, and amount of secured and unsecured debt are among the facts he seeks in the
initial client consultation); Telephone Interview with Steven Schwaber, Owner, Law Offices of
Steven Schwaber (Dec. 30, 2009) (explaining that in an initial consultation he obtains the
information required to complete the schedules on a bankruptcy petition).
100. Telephone Interview with Peter M. Lively, supra note 99 ("Very few bankruptcy
attorneys handle litigation."); Telephone Interview with Steven Schwaber, supra note 99
(revealing that he has never pursued lender liability on behalf of a client nor referred a client to
another attorney to litigate a claim against a lender).
101. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 99, at 90; Telephone Interview with Steven Schwaber,
supra note 99 (stating that he uses a form to determine what questions to ask a client in the initial
consultation).
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defense."102 They also reinforce the idea that determining a potential
client's legal position is a matter of simply applying the elements of
various legal doctrines to the facts relayed by the client."' Therefore,
these trappings of legal practice result in a disservice to those with
viable reverse-redlining claims.
Also, a victim of reverse redlining often seeks the advice of a
bankruptcy or real-estate attorney whose areas of expertise do not
include civil rights law.'" The plaintiffs own account of the facts
does nothing to inform the attorney of possible causes of actions
outside the attorney's expertise. Moreover, in situations where the
potential client is on the verge of foreclosure,' the thoughts of all
the parties are on defenses, not on affirmative claims.'
Even if an attorney is familiar with enough civil rights law to
understand the basics of disparate impact theory, the client's facts
alone are insufficient to ascertain the viability of a reverse-redlining
claim. The attorney would need to adjourn the meeting without
apprising the potential client of his or her legal position in order to
investigate whether the client's lender made similar loans to other
class members. However, "[a] client will typically expect an
immediate explanation of his/her legal rights,"'" and ending the
meeting without fulfilling this expectation is at odds with an
attorney's desire to win the client's business. Thus, even in the rare
situations when attorneys recognize reverse-redlining claims, there
102. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 99, at 90.
103. Id. ("When such lists are relied upon . . . without independent research of the law,
important substantive areas may not be investigated.").
104. Barry K. Tagawa, Collection and Bankruptcy Practice: The Third Highest Area of
Malpractice Exposure, 3 No. 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 1, 15 (1992) (discussing the
specialized nature of bankruptcy practice); Telephone Interview with Steven Schwaber, supra
note 99 (revealing that he is unfamiliar with the term "reverse redlining").
105. See Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877-81 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (adjudicating the claims of four joint plaintiffs and mentioning that at least three of the four
were facing foreclosure). It could safely be assumed that most reverse-redlining plaintiffs are in
similar situations. See, e.g., Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-09-2035 SC, 2009 WL
2365881, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2009); Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp.
2d 1039, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Williams Complaint, supra note 71, at $ 43 ("Mr. Williams
received a letter from Bank of America stating that it was going to foreclose . . . ."); Barkley
Complaint, supra note 3, at 158 ("As a result of the property flipping scheme ... [Ms. Barkley]
is at risk of losing her home."); Hargraves Complaint, supra note 71, at $ 35 ("Defendants ...
obtained an order from the bankruptcy court permitting defendants to foreclose.
106. See supra note 100.
107. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 99, at 100.
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are incentives for them to focus on other options that provide
potential clients with more immediate satisfaction."'
Psychological obstacles, informational asymmetries, and
shortcomings in the legal profession have deprived the courts of the
opportunity to enforce the FHA and ECOA's prohibitions of reverse
redlining. However, claim recognition is not the whole problem. As
discussed below, even when plaintiffs and their lawyers realize that
such claims exist, they still must overcome the substantial burden of
stating a prima facie case.
IV. GOOD FACTS ARE HARD TO FIND:
HOW A PLEADING STANDARD THAT REQUIRES UNAVAILABLE
INFORMATION THWARTS REVERSE-REDLINING PLAINTIFFS
In addition to preventing recognition of reverse-redlining claims,
the disconnect between a plaintiffs knowledge and the facts
essential to his or her claim makes drafting a complaint more
onerous. As discussed above, an individual reverse-redlining plaintiff
must establish the prima facie elements established in Matthews v.
New Century Mortgage: (1) he or she is a member of a protected
class; (2) he or she applied for a loan and was qualified for that loan;
(3) he or she received a loan on grossly unfair terms; and (4) either
(a) the lender continued to give loans to similarly qualified applicants
on significantly better terms, or (b) the lender intentionally targeted
the plaintiff because of his or her race.'09 Unless plaintiffs can prove
that they were intentionally targeted, they must pursue extensive
investigation beyond their own experiences, often including
complicated statistical analysis, to show disparities between their
loan terms and those of similarly situated borrowers.
Reverse-redlining litigation imposes several burdens on the
plaintiff that are not experienced by a litigant pursuing a traditional
claim. First, utilizing existing sources of statistical data to
demonstrate disparate impact is fraught with difficulties. Second, the
pre-discovery investigation required of reverse-redlining plaintiffs is
time-consuming and expensive. Finally, the persuasiveness of the
plaintiffs case suffers from the disconnect between the plaintiffs
own injury and his or her offer of proof. These challenges have led
108. Id.
109. Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., No. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM), 2007 WL 2437810, at
*13-14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007); Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 886.
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many individual plaintiffs to reject prong four of the Matthews model
altogether, opting to plead intentional targeting rather than disparate
impact. 10
A. Struggling to Use the HMDA Data to
Solve the Discrimination Equation
Again, the most accessible source of statistics for reverse-
redlining plaintiffs is the HMDA data. However, to fully utilize the
HMDA data, plaintiffs must first analyze the information for their
particular loan and lender, then compare this data to statistics for
other types of loans, and then compare those numbers to data
reported by other lenders. Ultimately, even this may not be enough
because the HMDA data do not contain information necessary to
control for differences of creditworthiness.
1. Comparing Different Loan Types to Expose Latent Disparities
Let's return to the Wells Fargo 2005 HMDA data for first-lien
refinance loans generated in the Los Angeles area."' The illustration
below is simplified.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 629 73 35 25
White 7479 218 141 59
Hispanic 2515 193 115 60
The table reveals that the percentage of African-Americans who
received expensive refinance loans in 2005 was nearly four times the
percentage of whites.112 However, to get the complete picture of
110. See, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 Fed. App'x 364, 369 (11th Cir. 2009);
Singh, 2009 WL 2365881, at *5; Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009
WL 2252528, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); House v. Cal State Mortg. Co., No. CV-F-08-1880
OWW/GSA, 2009 WL 2031775, at *19 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009); Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at
*2; Wiltshire v. Dhanraj, 421 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Munoz v. Int'l Home
Capital Corp., No. C 03-01099 RS, 2004 WL 3086907, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2004); Gee v.
Lucky Realty Homes, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 732, 733 (D. Md. 2002); Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d
at 886; Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 885-86 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
111. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAM. COUNCIL, supra note 48.
112. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating that 10.4 percent of loans to African-
Americans qualified for price reporting compared to only 2.8 percent of loans to whites).
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statistical discrepancies, plaintiffs must analyze loan data outside
their particular loan categories. A plaintiff would not know it by
looking at only the refinance loan data, but the price disparities
between Wells Fargo's white and minority borrowers were greater
than the table above indicates. The next illustration represents Wells
Fargo's home purchase loans for 2005.13
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
HOME PURCHASE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 176 13 8 5
White 3765 49 37 10
Hispanic 831 43 33 8
Here, the discrepancies are even more pronounced. Rounded to
the nearest tenth, 6.9 percent of African-Americans received
expensive purchase loans from Wells Fargo in 2005 while only
1.2 percent of white borrowers received such loans. Thus, plaintiffs
whose claims related to refinance loans in 2005 would not know the
full extent of existing statistical disparities if they only analyzed data
pertaining to their types of loans.
In addition, the type of loan a borrower receives-whether a
home purchase loan, second mortgage, refinance loan, or home
equity line of credit (HELOC) 114-affects the loan's price.115
Therefore, a plaintiff must not only analyze the terms received by
borrowers of the same type of loan, but he or she must also
investigate the racial makeup of borrowers in different loan
categories. For example, another interesting pattern emerges by
comparing the two Wells Fargo tables, reprinted below.
113. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAM. COUNCIL, DISCLOSURE TABLE 11-3: PRICING INFORMATION
FOR CONVENTIONAL HOME-PURCHASE LOANS, FIRST LIEN, 1- TO 4-FAMILY OWNER-OCCUPIED
DWELLING (EXCLUDES MANUFACTURED HOMES), By BORROWER OR CENSUS TRACT
CHARACTERISTICS, 2005 (2006), http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/pdf/2005/Hmda/temp/
2005HDI 1-3_0000001741131084.PDF.
114. A HELOC is usually a second mortgage, but instead of the borrower receiving the
principal up front, the lender promises to advance funds up to a certain amount at the time of the
borrower's choosing. See Jack M. Guttentag, Mortgage Glossary (2009), http://www.mtg
professor.com/glossary.htm.
115. See infra text accompanying note 116.
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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 629 73 35 25
White 7479 218 141 1 59
Hispanic 2515 193 115 60
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
HOME PURCHASE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
Afican-American 176 13 8 5
White 3765 49 37 10
Hispanic 831 43 33 8
The tables above indicate that minority borrowers received a
greater proportion of the refinance loans generated in 2005 than of
home-purchase loans. Specifically, African-Americans received
6.3 percent of the refinance loans represented in the table while they
received only 3.8 percent of the home-purchase loans. Hispanics
follow the same pattern. They account for 24.5 percent of the
refinance loans represented but only 18 percent of the home-
purchase loans. Meanwhile, with whites, the pattern is reversed.
White borrowers received 69.2 percent of the refinance loans
illustrated above and 78.2 percent of the home-purchase loans.
Significantly, the data above also show that Wells Fargo's
refinance loans are considerably more expensive than its home-
purchase loans. While 4.4 percent of refinance loans had interest
rates high enough to reach the HMDA reporting range, only
2.2 percent of home-purchase loans hit that mark. These findings
might imply that Wells Fargo targeted borrowers from disadvantaged
groups for more costly refinance loans while neglecting to offer them
home-purchase products. Worse, the findings could indicate
refinance schemes in which loan officers repeatedly persuaded
borrowers to refinance, all the while generating more and more
fees.'16 Most importantly, the findings add a new dimension to the
price disparities discovered in the first matrix.
116. Willis, supra note 7, at 734-35 ("'I did not understand that every time I did a new loan, I
was being charged a bunch of fees."').
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Thus, plaintiffs counsel should not only analyze the price
discrepancies for the plaintiffs particular loan category, but also
assess the racial constitution of each loan product's borrowers. As
illustrated, this is no easy feat. Further, even this level of data-
crunching may not be enough. Loan disparities can have many
causes, including income and credit-score differences between
different types of borrowers. Moreover, as discussed below,
sometimes this analysis fails to uncover any disparities at all, even
though the plaintiff was a victim of reverse redlining.
2. Comparing the Data of Prime and
Subprime Lenders to Detect Steering
Using the HMDA data is even less effective when the
discriminatory practice at issue is steering. Steering is the practice by
which brokers and loan officers direct minority borrowers to lenders
that deal predominantly in subprime loans."7 The HMDA data for a
lender who primarily sells subprime products will not reflect
disparities because most of its loans are expensive. Rather, the
discrimination occurs before the loan is originated, when brokers
refer African-American and Hispanic borrowers to these subprime
lenders. The situation can get even more confusing when a lending
institution that deals predominately in prime lending products creates
a subprime affiliate."' The principal company and the subsidiary
often have the same or similar names. This scenario can greatly
confuse plaintiffs trying to amass the essential data to state a reverse-
redlining claim.'
For instance, the result of the statistical analysis is considerably
different when the source of the HMDA data is Wells Fargo's
subprime subsidiary, Wells Fargo Financial (WFF).'20 The table
117. See id. at 802; Brescia, supra note 13, at 193.
118. Brescia, supra note 13, at 202-03.
119. Consider, for example, Countrywide Bank, FSB, Countrywide Home Loans,
Countrywide KB Home Loans, and Countrywide Real Estate Finance. See FFIEC.gov, Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, Disclosure Report, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/
DisWelcome.aspx (enter "Countrywide" under "Institution Name" and click "retrieve
institutions") (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
120. Thomas Lee, Subprime: And in This Corner . .. As the Subprime Loan Market Begins
Hammering Lenders, Can Wells Fargo Avoid a Body Blow?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 18,
2007, at DI ("[Wells Fargo] was one of the first mainstream banks to enter the subprime
business .. ., establishing a ... subsidiary, Wells Fargo Financial, to handle such lending.").
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below represents WFF's 2005 HMDA data for first-lien refinance
loans originated in the Los Angeles area.121
WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL (WFF)
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 214 62 46 12
White 753 200 159 33
Hispanic 470 125 100 20
It appears that there are no significant pricing disparities. While
22 percent of the African-Americans represented in the table
received loans classified as expensive, 21 percent of whites received
such loans. The results are the same for Hispanic borrowers. A
reverse-redlining plaintiff suing WFF may feel he or she has hit a
dead end at this point. However, the picture changes when one
compares WFF's data illustrated above with the Wells Fargo data
analyzed in the previous pages.
WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL (WFF)
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 214 62 46 12
White 753 200 159 33
Hispanic 470 125 100 20
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
REFINANCE LOANS, FIRST LIEN LOS ANGELES 2005
Race # without # with 3.00- 4.00-
price price 3.99% 4.99%
African-American 629 73 35 25
White 7479 218 141 59
Hispanic 2515 193 115 60
A comparison of the data between the two Wells Fargo lenders
reveals huge disparities in the racial constitution of the prime
lender's and subprime affiliate's customers. According to the figures
above, African-Americans received 19.2 percent of WFF's refinance
loans while they only received 6.3 percent of Wells Fargo's
121. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAM. COUNCIL, supra note 48.
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refinance loans. More than three times as many African-Americans
in the Los Angeles area were customers of WFF, the subprime
subsidiary, than of Wells Fargo, which produces mostly prime
mortgages. As expected, WFF's loans have a much greater
likelihood of having a high enough APR to require price reporting.
Twenty-six percent of WFF's loans reached this pricing threshold
compared to only 4.4 percent of Wells Fargo's loans.
The analysis above illustrates the type of synthesis and
explication of data that is often required of reverse-redlining
plaintiffs. Disparities may not always be apparent to plaintiffs or the
attorneys who represent them when these borrowers' brokers steered
them to subprime lenders or spread the cost of their loans among
several loan products.122 Not only must plaintiffs compare the prices
received by racial groups for a specific loan sold by a particular
lending institution, but they must compare the statistics for different
types of loans and for prime and subprime lenders. These challenges
undermine much of the usefulness of the HMDA data.
B. The Prohibitive Costs ofDisparate Impact Analysis
Even if individual plaintiffs effectively scrutinize and delineate
the HMDA data, courts may still dismiss their claims.'23 Because the
HMDA data do not control for creditworthiness factors, lenders
argue that the data do not reflect discriminatory lending decisions.124
Anticipating this argument, well-funded class-action plaintiffs and
government litigators amass additional empirical studies that account
for legitimate underwriting risk factors. For example, two
plaintiffs-the City of Baltimore in its action against Wells Fargo
and the NAACP in its lawsuit against Ameriquest Mortgage-
supplemented explication of the HMDA data with empirical studies
122. See Miller Class Action Complaint, supra note 55, at $162-65.
123. See Henry M. Jay, Full Disclosure: How Should Lenders Respond to the Heightened
Reporting Requirements of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act?, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 247,
257 (2006) ("Fair housing community groups and class action attorneys know that HMDA data
alone cannot be used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ECOA and
FHA... .").
124. See Letter from Steven I. Zeisel, Senior Counsel, Consumer Bank Ass'n, to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Apr. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.cbanet.org/files/FileDownloads/HMDA_4-12-02.pdf ("Without knowing the factors
known to the creditor, one cannot assess the reason why any consumer may get a particular
APR.").
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that utilized credit-scoring data obtained from credit bureaus. 125 In
addition, both of these plaintiffs retained experts to do the statistical
analysis. 126
In contrast, individual plaintiffs lack both the time and resources
for such in-depth investigation. Reverse-redlining litigation is very
expensive, imposing significant costs even on adequately financed
litigants.' The cost of hired experts becomes even more
burdensome because plaintiffs require their services at the pleading
stage, when a settlement or jury award is still far off. In response,
most individual plaintiffs have decided simply to plead their own
facts and hope they create a strong enough inference of
discrimination. 128
C. Choosing Emotional Impact over Disparate Impact
Another reason that individual plaintiffs choose to plead
intentional targeting rather than disparate impact is because statistics
lack emotional appeal. A few individual reverse-redlining plaintiffs
have successfully combined persuasive stories of intentional racial
targeting with statistical evidence of disparate impact, pleading both
125. Mayor & City Council of Balt. Complaint, supra note 15, at $$ 32-35; Class Action
Complaint at $ 2-3, NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(No. 07-0794).
126. Brendan Kearney, U.S. District Judge J Frederick Motz Hears Wells Fargo's Motion to
Dismiss 'Reverse Redlining' Suit, DAILY REC. (Balt.), Dec. 14, 2009 (contrasting Baltimore's
"expert statistical analysis" in its case against Wells Fargo with failed reverse-redlining cases by
other cities); Telephone Interview with Angela Ciccolo, Gen. Counsel, NAACP (Sept. 11, 2009).
127. See Kearney, supra note 126 (explaining that Baltimore citizens have criticized the
mayor of Baltimore because the cost of the city's case against Wells Fargo may exceed any jury
award).
128. See Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App'x 364, 369 (11th Cir. 2009); Singh v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-09-2035 SC, 2009 WL 2365881 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2009);
Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
July 29, 2009); House v. Cal State. Mortg. Co., No. CV-F-08-1880 OWW/GSA, 2009 WL
2031775 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., Nos. 04 CV 875(RJD)(KAM),
05 CV 187(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 4386(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5302(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV
5362(RJD)(KAM), 05 CV 5679(RJD)(KAM), 2007 WL 2437810 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007);
Wiltshire v. Dhanraj, 421 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Munoz v. Int'l Home Capital Corp.,
No. C 03-0199 RS, 2004 WL 3086907 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2004); Gee v. Lucky Realty Homes,
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D. Md. 2002); Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp.
2d 874, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885
(N.D. 111. 2000).
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theories in the alternative.' 29 However, numerous individual plaintiffs
have focused exclusively on racial targeting.130
When an individual plaintiffs case focuses on class-wide
injuries reflected in abstract statistics and equations, the personal
story behind the lawsuit disappears. As Roman philosopher Cicero
said, "[M]en decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or
anger, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear .. . than by reality,
or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or
statute.""' This maxim is clearly true for reverse-redlining plaintiffs.
However, plaintiffs must present particularly shocking facts to
provoke such feelings in a judge.
In Matthews v. New Century Mortgage, four elderly female
plaintiffs alleged intentional, class-based targeting.'32 They were
successful partially because the facts of the case were so egregious:
lenders inflated the plaintiffs' incomes on loan application forms,
lied to the plaintiffs about the actual amounts of their loans, and
neglected to give the plaintiffs copies of the loan documents."' In
addition, Matthews and the other plaintiffs made sympathetic
claimants. 134
Even the City of Baltimore recognized the value of emotional
impact in its case against Wells Fargo."' Pleading both disparate
impact and intentional targeting, the city presented the affidavits of
former Wells Fargo employees who had personal knowledge of the
inner workings of the lender. These affidavits revealed very
disturbing conduct by Wells Fargo management and loan officers,
including regularly referring to minority neighborhoods as the
"subprime ghetto" and publishing promotional materials in a
129. Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21-22 (D. D.C. 2000).
130. See supra note 128.
131. 2 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore, in 3 CICERO 196, 362 (E. H. Wamington ed., E.
W. Sutton & H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1942).
132. Matthews, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 877-82.
133. Id.
134. See id. Similarly, in Munoz v. International Home Capital Corp., lenders took advantage
of Hispanic borrowers' limited English language skills to trick them into a predatory lending
scheme. See Munoz v. Int'l Home Capital Corp., No. C 03-0199 RS, 2004 WL 3086907 (N.D.
Cal. May 4, 2004).
135. Mayor & City Council ofBalt. Complaint, supra note 15, at T 71.
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vernacular they dubbed "African-American."1 16 These facts added a
visceral dimension to an already well-pled complaint.
Other plaintiffs have not had as much success. In Williams v.
2000 Homes Inc.,' the plaintiff focused on intentional targeting
while alleging disparate impact only as a simple recitation of the
fourth prong of the Matthews model.' t But without the objectively
outrageous facts alleged in Matthews or Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,'" the court dismissed the
plaintiffs targeting and disparate impact claims.' 40 The court stated
that the complaint failed "to suggest that the terms of those loans
were influenced by Williams's race."' 4 '
Although the facts of Williams did not have the same shock
value as those in Matthews, they at least suggested that the defendant
targeted the plaintiff based on his race. In the complaint, the plaintiff
described a photo album "conspicuously" placed on the coffee table
in the defendant's reception area.'42 The photo album contained
photos of happy home owners posing as the defendant's
customers.'43 All of the people in the photos were African-
American.'" The complaint also alleged that the defendants roped
the plaintiff into a "property-flipping" scheme, a practice whereby
lenders have properties fraudulently over-appraised in order to sell
them at "artificially inflated value[s]."'4 5 The complaint described the
lender showing the plaintiff several of these over-appraised
properties.' 46 All of the properties were in predominately minority
neighborhoods.147
136. Id at TT 70-71.
137. No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009).
138. Williams Complaint, supra note 71, at 74 ("[The loans] were made on less favorable
terms than loans defendants brokered or made to Caucasian individuals.").
139. 631 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2009), dismissed on other grounds, 677 F. Supp. 2d 847
(D. Md. 2010).
140. Williams, 2009 WL 2252528, at *6.
141. Id
142. Williams Complaint, supra note 71, at T 27.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Id at 31.
147. Id
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These are facts from which a fact finder might infer racial
targeting, but they did not have as much dramatic effect as the
plaintiffs' stories in Matthews. The plaintiff in Williams did not offer
enough objective evidence or enough pathos to survive a motion to
dismiss. To be successful, he needed to supplement his facts with
outside data of his lender's other customers.
For plaintiffs without facts clearly indicating direct evidence of
class-based targeting,148 proving intentional targeting is even more
difficult than proving disparate impact.'49 At least when plaintiffs
plead disparate impact, they have the possibility of finding the
essential facts to state their claims. However, a plaintiff basing his or
her case entirely on intentional targeting either has this "direct
evidence" or does not. Thus, many plaintiffs who have taken this
route have had their cases dismissed. 50
While Congress explicitly intended private litigants to shoulder
most of the burden of enforcing the FHA and ECOA,'"' only class
actions, government entities, and large public-interest organizations
like the NAACP have had any consistent success litigating reverse-
redlining claims.'52 This implicates serious enforcement problems.
Congress's emphasis on individual plaintiffs enforcing these laws'5 3
is at odds with the serious difficulties of successfully litigating
reverse-redlining claims. Without legislative action to ensure that
these laws are enforced, reverse-redlining claims will go
unaddressed, which will perpetuate perverse incentives and the lack
148. See Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886-87 (S.D. Ohio
2002).
149. See Aleo & Svirsky, supra note 15, at 21 (noting the difficulty of proving intent).
150. See, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 Fed. App'x 364, 369 (11th Cir. 2009);
Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-09-2035 SC, 2009 WL 2365881, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
July 30, 2009); Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16 (JG)(JMA), 2009 WL 2252528, at
*5-6 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); House v. Cal State Mortg. Co., No. CV-F-08-1880 OWW/GSA,
2009 WL 2031775 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009); Wiltshire v. Dhanraj, 421 F. Supp. 2d 544, 552-55
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
151. S. REP. No. 94-589, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,415.
152. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d
702, 704 (D. Md. 2009), dismissed on other grounds, 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010);
NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Taylor v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Miller v.
Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008); Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortg.
Funding, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
153. S. REP. NO. 94-589, at 13.
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of accountability that brought about the current mortgage crisis and
its disparate impact on minority communities.
V. FILLING THE INFORMATION GAP:
PUTTING VICTIMS OF REVERSE REDLINING IN
TOUCH WITH THEIR CLASS
Due to the problems individual plaintiffs face in recognizing and
litigating reverse-redlining claims, the FHA and ECOA are
ineffective at stopping discriminatory lending. In order for Congress
to realize its goal of eradicating housing discrimination in the United
States, Congress must bolster enforcement of the FHA and ECOA on
all fronts. First, new legislation should require the federal agencies
currently responsible for implementing the FHA and ECOA to
conduct extensive audits of lenders for indicators of reverse
redlining. Additionally, the law should require the DOJ to file civil-
enforcement actions on behalf of aggrieved classes against any
lenders responsible for significant price disparities. In addition, the
new FHA and ECOA should require federal agencies to publish the
audit results so that private plaintiffs can utilize the data in litigation.
Finally, the law should compel HUD to launch an intensive public-
education campaign informing the public about reverse redlining and
borrowers' rights under the FHA and ECOA.
A. Federal Agencies Should Audit Lenders for
Signs of Disparate Impact
Access to information is the greatest impediment to the
enforcement of the FHA and ECOA against reverse redlining. The
regulatory scheme described below mandates government agencies
to conduct orderly investigations of lenders' business practices at the
lowest possible costs to mortgagors and taxpayers. An effective
auditing scheme would require consistent application and aggressive
oversight. Selection criteria for audits would have to be unambiguous
and provide lenders with notice of compliance requirements. This
would require a specific test to identify which lenders should be
audited. In addition, a disinterested government body should oversee
the auditing agencies to ensure that these agencies fulfill their new
duties.
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1. Overview of the Lender Audit
The audit system would function as follows. Before conducting
a full audit of any lender, federal agencies would regularly analyze
existing sources of data including the HMDA reporting figures,
census information, and complaints filed with the agencies.'5 4 From
this information, these agencies would identify disparities significant
enough to warrant further scrutiny. Where indicated, these agencies
would then conduct audits consisting of examinations of statistically
representative, stratified samples of mortgage transactions, followed
by a more detailed loan-level review if necessary. The audits would
only focus on lenders whose initial reviews uncovered significant
(not simply incidental) disparities in loan prices among racial groups.
2. Selection Criteria
Currently, courts and regulators must choose among various
tests to measure statistical disparities for indicators of disparate
impact discrimination."' In the employment context, regulators
commonly use the "four-fifths rule."' 56 Simply stated, this rule uses a
20-percent disparity between racial groups as the statistical
benchmark for establishing disparate impact. The logic behind this
test is that a 20-percent disparity is large enough to eliminate the
possibility that it occurred by chance. "' In the lending context, the
four-fifths rule could be applied either to differences in the average
APRs that a lender offered to different racial groups or to disparities
in the percentage of the loans extended to each group that were
priced high enough to qualify for price reporting under the HMDA.
Unfortunately, this approach presents several problems. First, in
order to effectively use the formula, regulators would have to control
for creditworthiness factors. While a 20-percent disparity in an
employer's hiring rate may be considered large enough to allow for
the possibility of other causal variables," it does not leave enough
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006).
155. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination,
84 IND. L.J. 773, 773-74 (2009). See generally Stephen L. Ross & John Yinger, Uncovering
Discrimination: A Comparison of the Methods Used by Scholars and Civil Rights Enforcement
Officials, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 562, 564-95 (2006) (discussing three approaches).
156. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(D) (2009).
157. Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 312 (1993); see Peresie, supra note 155, at 782.
158. See Greenberger, supra note 157, at 312.
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room to compensate for the multitude of legitimate factors that
inform loan underwriting.'59 Meanwhile, expanding the audit-
selection phase to include consideration of variables like credit
scores would defeat the purpose of the audits themselves-to get the
information necessary for thorough statistical analysis directly from
lenders. Finally, because the four-fifths rule only focuses on a single
firm, it would not catch discriminatory practices, such as steeringl6 0
and racial targeting, of lenders who exclusively sell subprime
mortgages.''
A better option would be to compare loan pricing across several
lenders. This approach would entail pooling'62 data from several
lenders serving the same market and identifying significant
deviations from the typical credit terms offered to particular
communities.'63 Social scientists consider disparities more than two
standard deviations from the mean statistically significant,'6 4 and
courts have applied this standard in discrimination cases.'65 Under a
pooling method, if the average APR offered by a specific lender for a
particular community is more than two standard deviations from the
mean for the other lenders serving the same community and market
(i.e., the pool), the lender would be audited.
This approach should be effective as long as data pools consist
only of lenders with similar market niches.'66 Regulators would have
to take special care not to pool prime and subprime lenders together.
159. STEPHEN Ross & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT 325-26 (2002) ("Under such a
standard . . . a prima facie case for disparate-impact discrimination could be built against the
majority of lenders in the nation."). Inversely, this standard may also condone discrimination that
results in less than a 20 percent disparity. Id. at 326.
160. See supra Part IV.A.2.
161. See Ross & Yinger, supra note 155, at 576-77 ("[A] sample cannot control for firm
characteristics . . .
162. Id at 606.
163. See id. at 594.
164. MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW 565 (2005). The standard deviation is the average
distance from the mean for any given data set. See Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday
Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits,
92 MINN. L. REv. 1110, 1144 (2008). Two standard deviations is twice this measurement. In a
typical distribution, only 5 percent of observations would fall outside two standard deviations of
the mean. Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the
Current Credit Crisis, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 267, 281 n.56 (2009).
165. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n. 17 (1977).
166. See Cynthea E. Geerdes, Now You See It, Now You Don't: When Color-Conscious
Means Color-Blind, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 176, 182 (2003).
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Otherwise, disparities would be indicative only of the markets they
serve. However, if all lenders in a data pool serve customers with
similar credit characteristics and the sampling is large enough,
significant deviations from the norm could be powerful evidence of
disparate impact.' 7
Admittedly, this method focuses on outliers while allowing the
average level of discrimination to continue undisturbed.'6 8 However,
eliminating overt discrimination will decrease the overall disparate
impact in the pool. Statistically, this will translate into a lower
standard deviation from the mean and a closer baseline for
establishing disparate impact. Thus, even lenders who are currently
safely within the status quo may eventually become the targets of
audits if they do not take measures to avoid practices that cause
disparate impact.
No matter which test they apply, regulators would need to
establish clear guidelines of what constituted "significant disparities"
so as to give lenders notice and allow them to implement self-testing.
If a lender does trigger an audit, investigators would delve into the
company's operating procedures, attempting to identify a causal link
between lending practices and the disparate effects. If investigators
discover evidence of discrimination, they would immediately
forward their findings to the DOJ.
3. Oversight of Federal Agencies
New legislation must also require oversight of federal agencies
to ensure that they implement these directives. In recent years,
HUD's performance in processing and investigating discrimination
complaints has been notoriously poor.' 9 Amendments to the FHA
and ECOA must impose consequences on federal agencies for
enforcement failures. If the agencies responsible for implementing
the FHA and the ECOA fail to fulfill their duties, Congress should
revoke those agencies' jurisdiction over civil rights matters and
167. See Ross & Yinger, supra note 155, at 608.
168. Id. at 603-05 ("If all firms practice disparate impact discrimination . . . it will be
buried .... ); see also id at 593 n.28 ("[If all groups of officers discriminate equally against a
protected class . .. this discrimination will not change the intergroup rankings of treatment and
performance.").
169. E.g, Michael B. de Leeuw et al., The Current State of Residential Segregation and
Housing Discrimination: The United States' Obligations Under the International Convention on
the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 377 (2008).
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create a new agency to monitor and prevent discrimination in
lending.
B. Combining Public and Private Litigation to
Deter Discriminatory Lending
This new legislation would also bolster enforcement through
litigation. After receiving evidence of reverse redlining, the new laws
would require the DOJ to initiate a civil enforcement action against
the lender on behalf of the aggrieved class. In addition, federal
agencies would publish the results of audits to aid private plaintiffs
and inform future customers. Meanwhile, the government should
initiate a public education campaign to teach citizens about reverse
redlining and their rights under the FHA and ECOA. In addition to
addressing the enforcement problems identified in the previous
sections, collaboration between the government and other litigants
would lessen the fiscal burden of public litigation.
1. The DOJ at the Helm: The Advantages of Public Litigation
Previous sections indicated that municipalities and class actions
accounted for most of the successful reverse-redlining plaintiffs.
Beyond their obvious advantage in resources over individual
plaintiffs, these bodies are best situated to claim injury for a
widespread class because they represent the class itself. Thus, when a
class or government body brings a disparate impact claim, there is no
disconnect between the injury and the facts necessary to state the
claim. The injury is the disparate impact. The federal government, as
the representative of the people, is another natural litigant of reverse-
redlining claims.
In addition, the federal government is the only entity with the
resources and expertise to litigate against large financial institutions.
Because lenders know the DOJ has the resources to win these cases,
most of the DOJ's civil rights cases against lenders settle,' avoiding
the expense of drawn-out lawsuits and accomplishing the main goal
of deterrence.
Finally, because the government would bring these actions on
behalf of the public, the DOJ could pursue remedies tailored to the
170. Of the hundreds of discrimination cases listed on the DOJ website, all but a handful have
settled. See Housing & Civil Enforcement Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fair Housing Cases,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/housing/fairhousing/caseslist.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
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public interest rather than to the financial needs of individuals. For
example, rather than seeking pecuniary damages, the DOJ could seek
foreclosure stays and injunctions compelling liable lenders to modify
the mortgages of borrowers who are on the verge of default."' While
some borrowers not in the protected class may experience a windfall,
these remedies would provide the greatest benefit to minority
communities since these communities suffer disproportionately from
foreclosures."' Not only would injunctions and foreclosure stays
make victims whole and deter lending discrimination, but they would
also serve the public good.
2. The Second Front:
Equipping Private Plaintiffs with the Data They Need to Win
In order to involve private plaintiffs in enforcing the FHA's and
ECOA's prohibitions of reverse redlining, federal agencies must
provide them with the data they need to reach discovery. Therefore,
federal agencies should publish audits that illustrate which lenders'
policies result in disparate impacts. Rather than publishing audit
results in the complicated form of the HMDA reporting data,
regulators should take the approach of the agencies that grade banks
for compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)."'
Similar to the HMDA, the CRA was enacted by Congress in 1977 to
combat redlining and compel banks to reinvest in the communities
from which they received deposits.'74 However, unlike the HMDA,
which only focuses on reporting, under the CRA regulators enforce
the law by examining and grading banks on their compliance."'
These grades affect whether lenders receive approval for certain
171. The attorneys general of several states recently sued predatory lenders seeking similar
relief. See Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen. for D.C., District Announces Settlement With
Countrywide (Sept. 8, 2009), http://newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx/agency/occ/section/2/release/
18044; see also Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (seeking declaratory judgment with respect to
Countrywide's settlement with attorneys general of seven states requiring it to modify the terms
of numerous mortgage loans it serviced).
172. See supra note 17.
173. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-
2908 (2006)).
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901; Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The
Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 628 (2009).
175. Brescia, supra note 174, at 628-29. The ratings assigned are "outstanding,"
"satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial noncompliance." 12 C.F.R. § 345.28(a)
(2009).
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transactions.176 The grades are also disclosed to the public, clearly
conveying lenders' records for providing equal access to credit
without any need for the inquirer to engage in additional analysis.
Likewise, regulators auditing for disparate impact should reduce
publication of each audit finding to an abstract containing a simple
expression of a conclusion about whether a lender is responsible for
significant disparities. The abstract should also provide a ratio
representing the disparities in the average APRs offered to the
targeted racial class and whites. This would eliminate the expensive
and painstaking analysis likely to discourage individual plaintiffs and
their counsel at the pleading stage. The actual calculations should be
available in addition to a clear step-by-step explanation of the
analysis undertaken, but the abstract alone should constitute strong
evidence of disparate impact. 7 1
Accordingly, as other litigants have more success, the strain on
taxpayers imposed by public litigation will decrease. Also, the threat
of multiple lawsuits may be just what lenders need to push them to
examine their practices for disparate impact and reform those
practices when disparities are found. Finally, by implementing these
changes, Congress's vision that individual plaintiffs play an
important role in enforcing the FHA and ECOA would endure.
3. Educating Reverse-Redlining Victims About Their Rights
In order to take part in this enforcement effort, reverse-redlining
victims must first realize that they have legal claims. Thus, federal
agencies should crusade to educate the public about reverse
redlining. The government has previously embarked on similar
public-education campaigns, including in the area of employment
discrimination.17 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has been especially effective in educating the public about
the rights of employees and the responsibilities of employers under
Title VII. In addition to televised conferences, films, and public
176. 12 C.F.R. § 345.29; Brescia, supra note 174, at 635.
177. It also should be admissible through the public records exception to hearsay. See FED. R.
EVID. 803(8).
178. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Educating the Public About
Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/educating.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2010) (detailing the educational efforts of the agency through the years). In fact, the FHA
has a provision giving HUD the duty to conduct "educational and conciliatory activities." 42
U.S.C. § 3609 (2006).
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presentations,' 79 the EEOC has made its presence universally known
in America's workplaces by requiring its imprimatur on job
applications and mandating employers to display posters in the
workplace informing employees of their rights.'"
There is no reason why lenders should not be required to display
similar information on loan applications and at branch locations.
HUD should also require lenders to distribute informational
pamphlets to new customers informing them of their rights under the
FHA and ECOA, including the prohibition of lending activities that
have an adverse impact on protected classes. In addition, HUD
should reach out to community organizations, as the EEOC did to
labor and civil rights groups in the 1960s and '70s,'"' and make
presentations about reverse redlining at community-sponsored
events. Finally, HUD should utilize the power of the Internet,
making special use of social-networking sites and chat rooms to
introduce information about reverse redlining. This would help
connect individual reverse-redlining victims with each other.
Finally, if amendments to the FHA and ECOA strengthen the
acts' public-enforcement mechanisms, the public's awareness of its
rights under these laws will follow naturally. As classes become less
marginalized, they obtain greater awareness of their entitlements and
become more willing to take action.'82 Armed with this new
awareness and with the facts necessary to state claims, individual
plaintiffs will one day lead the way in enforcing the FHA and
ECOA, just as Congress intended.
C. Addressing the Consequences
This proposal will undoubtedly have its costs. Some of these
costs can be mitigated, as discussed below. Those costs that cannot
be avoided are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of greater
enforcement.
179. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 178.
180. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, The "EEO is the Law" Poster,
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov/employers/poster.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) ("The law requires an
employer to post notices describing the Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination . . .
181. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 178.
182. See Kaiser & Major, supra note 75, at 807-08.
1378 [Vol. 43: 1339
UNITED WE STAND, DISPARATE WE FALL
1. Over-Deterrence
The most serious concern is that stepped-up enforcement of laws
prohibiting lending discrimination will ironically lead to more
lending discrimination. Fear that originating higher-cost loans would
lead to audits could cause lending institutions to stop offering
subprime products, limiting the availability of credit for less-
qualified borrowers.'83 For this reason, audits would only focus on
lenders whose initial reviews uncovered significant disparities or
deviations rather than incidental variations. Reserving audits for only
those lenders responsible for significant disparities would allow
lenders to continue serving borrowers who pose a legitimate credit
risk. In addition, with clear guidelines to follow, lenders would likely
conclude that the benefits of transacting with this broad segment of
the market outweigh the costs of eliminating disparate impact from
their underwriting models and loan-marketing practices.
Also, diminishing the diversity of lending products currently
available may not be such a terrible consequence. By limiting the
subprime credit available to customers, the market will purge many
of the exotic loan products that have caused so much confusion. This
may help level some of the informational imbalances between
lenders and consumers.'8 4 Furthermore, this proposal does not aim to
redress the woes of borrowers with low incomes or credit scores. On
the contrary, the objective of this Article is to address the problem
faced by borrowers who were qualified for prime credit but received
more costly loans because of their race. Other policy solutions must
be pursued to serve the credit needs of less-qualified borrowers.
2. Fiscal Concerns
Admittedly, the economic costs of the program will be
significant. However, it is important to compare this expense with
the costs of reverse redlining. Predatory lending, including reverse
redlining, sparked a financial crisis that has already cost American
taxpayers more than a trillion dollars.' Cities are strewn with
foreclosed and abandoned homes, a great portion of them in
183. See Willis, supra note 7, at 829 ("[11]t is unsurprising that part of the solution to mortgage
overpricing will require reducing loan structure choices.").
184. Id. at 826-30.
185. See The Crisis, a Year Later, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A28 ("[Tihe final tab to
taxpayers will approach $1.2 trillion.").
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communities of color.' Credit is unavailable, unemployment hovers
around 10 percent, and the economy has shrunk for more than two
years.' Would all of this have happened without reverse redlining?
Perhaps it would have. But if lenders were more cognizant of the
impact their predation had on the public-whether that impact was
disparate or homogeneous across the board-maybe we could have
avoided this financial catastrophe.
VI. CONCLUSION
Let us return to the hypothetical that began this Article.
However, imagine that a year before Mr. Borrower's default,
Congress amended the FHA and ECOA, implementing every
suggestion made in this Article. Since then, Mr. Borrower attended a
church event at which HUD officials educated him about reverse
redlining. He also read a newspaper article about a crackdown by the
DOJ on lenders for the same discriminatory activities HUD referred
to at its presentation. Now, unable to pay his mortgage and believing
he may be a reverse-redlining victim, Mr. Borrower consults with a
civil rights attorney.
The lawyer is well-versed in the new amendments to the FHA
and ECOA and quickly checks to see if Mr. Borrower's lender has
been audited. He discovers that government regulators audited
Mr. Borrower's lender just last month and discovered significant
disparities negatively affecting African-American borrowers. After
some more statistical research, the attorney informs Mr. Borrower
that he seems to have a viable reverse-redlining claim.
Mr. Borrower's situation is now much better than it was at the
beginning of this Article. However, it still does not represent the best
of all possible worlds. Mr. Borrower should never have been a victim
of discrimination at all.
The Fair Housing Act begins as follows: "It is the policy of the
United States to provide . . . for fair housing throughout the United
States."'" Congress's intent is to eliminate discrimination, not
merely redress it. Relieving Mr. Borrower's injury is the means, not
the end. Ironically, while the scarcity of reverse-redlining plaintiffs
186. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council ofBalt. Complaint, supra note 15, at 14-5.
187. See Peter S. Goodman, 85,000 More Jobs Cut in December, Fogging Outlook, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at Al.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
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today may signify that the FHA and ECOA are not adequately
enforced, the same indicator may one day announce that this form of
discrimination has been largely eliminated. However, the
government, the courts, and private individuals all must play an
important role in getting us there.
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